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CONTRACT DESIGN AND THE SHADING 
PROBLEM 
ROBERT E. SCOTT* 
Despite recent advances in our understanding of contracting behavior, 
economic contract theory has yet to identify the principal causes and effects 
of contract breach.  In this Article, I argue that opportunism is a primary 
explanation for why commercial parties deliberately breach their contracts.  
I develop a novel variation on opportunism that I identify as “shading,” a 
behavior that more accurately describes the vexing problems courts face in 
rooting out strategic behavior in contract litigation.  I provide some 
empirical support for the claim that shading behavior is both pervasive in 
litigation over contract breach and extremely difficult for generalist courts 
to detect, and I offer an explanation for why this is so.  In contrast to courts 
of equity in pre-industrial England, generalist courts today are tasked with 
the challenge of interpreting contracts in a heterogeneous global economy.  
This has left generalist courts incapable of identifying with any degree of 
accuracy which of the litigants is behaving strategically.  I advance the claim 
that ex ante design by commercial parties is more effective in deterring 
opportunism in litigation than ex post evaluation of the contractual context 
by generalist courts.  I illustrate this claim by focusing on the critical roles 
of uncertainty and scale in determining how legally sophisticated parties, 
both individually and collectively, design their contracts.  By deploying 
sophisticated design strategies tailored to particular environments, parties 
are able both to reduce the risk of shading and to cabin the role of the 
decision maker tasked with policing this difficult-to-verify behavior.  I 
conclude that judges and contract theorists must attend to the unique 
characteristics of the contracts currently being designed by sophisticated 
 
 * Alfred McCormack Professor of Law and Director, Center for Contract and Economic 
Organization, Columbia Law School.  This Article develops ideas first presented as the Robert 
F. Boden Lecture at Marquette Law School, October 2014.  I am grateful for helpful comments 
from Ron Gilson, Dean Joseph Kearney, Roy Kreitner, Chuck Sabel, and participants at a 
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parties because it is the parties, not the courts, that reduce the risks of 
opportunistic shading in contract adjudication.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The law and economics of contract has had a great forty-year run.  
Three Nobel Prizes have been awarded to seven scholars for 
breakthroughs in the economics of information, with others probably yet 
to come.1  And, on the law side, there have been a number of seminal 
papers explicating the economic logic of contract law as well as offering 
trenchant normative critiques of inefficient doctrines.2  But despite these 
advances, contract design, the central subject at the core of the law and 
 
1.  George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz were jointly awarded the Nobel 
Prize in economics in 2001 for work on the implications of asymmetric information to contract 
theory.  The work of these scholars is summarized in Karl-Gustaf Löfgren et al., Markets with 
Asymmetric Information: The Contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph 
Stiglitz, 104 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 195, 195 (2002).  Subsequently, Leonid Hurwicz, Eric 
Maskin, and Roger Myerson were awarded the Nobel Prize in 2007 for their contributions to 
mechanism design theory.  Finally, Jean Tirole was named the Nobel Laureate in economics in 
2014 for his work on the economics of information and regulation. 
2.  For a review (and a critique) of the contribution of law and economics scholarship to 
contract law, see Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: 
Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003).  For a defense of the contribution of law and 
economics to contract law, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the 
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003). 
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economics of contract, remains something of a mystery.  To be sure, there 
are a few notable papers3 and a well-developed (albeit largely 
atheoretical) strategic management literature on contract design choices,4 
but in truth we know very little about the factors that influence how 
parties in the real world design their contracts.  There are several reasons 
for this gap in our understanding, but one in particular stands out: 
Economic contract theory has failed to explain adequately the causes and 
effects of contract breach.  One reason for this deficit is that breach is a 
difficult concept for economists to model.  In equilibrium there is no 
breach, and economics focuses on equilibrium conditions.  But common 
observation tells us that breach of contract is ubiquitous.  Faced with this 
wide gap between theory and reality, the answers to a critical empirical 
question remain elusive: How do sophisticated parties adjust ex ante to 
the prospect of breach ex post? 
Understanding how parties adjust to the prospect of breach is 
essential to a testable theory of contract, and nowhere is that knowledge 
more relevant today than in the current debate over contract 
interpretation.  Contract interpretation remains the single most 
important source of commercial litigation and the least settled, most 
contentious area of contemporary contract doctrine and scholarship.5  
Initially framed by the clash between the two intellectual giants of 
 
3.  See, e.g., Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The 
Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848 (2010); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel 
& Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL 
L. REV. 23 (2014); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract 
Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006). 
4.  See Nicholas S. Argyres, Janet Bercovitz & Kyle J. Mayer, Complementarity and 
Evolution of Contractual Provisions: An Empirical Study of IT Services Contracts, 18 ORG. SCI. 
3, 15 (2007) (“[C]ontractual partners . . . that had a longer history of transacting with each other 
were more likely to include contingency planning in their contracts.”); Kyle J. Mayer & 
Nicholas S. Argyres, Learning to Contract: Evidence from the Personal Computer Industry, 15 
ORG. SCI. 394, 396 (2004) (finding that successive contracts between the same two contracting 
partners become more complex over time as the partners learn how to address contracting 
hazards); Michael D. Ryall & Rachelle C. Sampson, Do Prior Alliances Influence Alliance 
Contract Structure?, in STRATEGIC ALLIANCES: GOVERNANCE AND CONTRACTS 206, 207 
(Africa Ariño & Jeffrey J. Reuer eds., 2006) (finding that contracts are more complete or 
detailed when firms have prior alliances, whether with the same firm or other firms). 
5.  An early empirical study found that 25.8% of a sample of 500 cases raised 
interpretation and parol evidence issues.  Harold Shepherd, Contracts in a Prosperity Year, 6 
STAN. L. REV. 208, 222–24 (1954); see also David A. Dilts, Of Words and Contracts: Arbitration 
and Lexicology, 60 DISP. RESOL. J. 41, 43 (2005) (“The construction of contract language is the 
controversy most evident in contract disputes.”); John P. Tomaszewski, The Pandora’s Box of 
Cyberspace: State Regulation of Digital Signatures and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 33 
GONZ. L. REV. 417, 432 (1997–1998) (“Most contract litigation involves disputes over 
construction of the terms in a contract.”). 
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contract, Samuel Williston and Arthur Corbin, and continuing to the 
present, two opposing positions have competed for dominance in contract 
interpretation.6  Many (indeed most) states follow a traditional, common 
law, “textualist” approach to interpretation.7  Here, when the writing is 
clear, courts are disabled from inquiring into the context surrounding the 
contract.8  In contrast, in states that follow California,9 and in all states 
where the subject matter involves the sale of goods under the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), the courts are “contextualists.”10  Here, courts 
are invited to consider the context regardless of the clarity of the written 
 
6.  For discussion, see Gilson, Sable & Scott, supra note 3, at 49–51. 
7.  A strong majority of U.S. courts continue to follow the traditional textualist or 
“formalist” approach to contract interpretation.  A state-by-state survey of recent court 
decisions shows that thirty-eight states follow the textualist approach to interpretation.  Nine 
states, joined by the UCC for sales cases and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, have 
adopted a contextualist or anti-formalist interpretive regime.  The remaining states’ doctrines 
are indeterminate.  See U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-202, 2-208 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2014); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 200, 209 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); Robert 
E. Scott, State-by-State Survey (Oct. 7, 2009) (on file with author). 
8.  This interpretive approach, followed by a substantial majority of common law courts, 
privileges integrated contracts over context evidence that arguably suggests the agreement 
contained additional or different terms or meanings.  Textualist jurisdictions, such as New 
York, use a “hard” parol evidence rule that gives presumptively conclusive effect to merger or 
integration clauses and, in their absence, presumes that the contract is fully integrated if it 
appears final and complete on its face.  See, e.g., Morgan Stanley High Yield Sec., Inc. v. Seven 
Circle Gaming Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 206, 214–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the prior 
agreement is excluded where the writing appears in view of thoroughness and specificity to 
embody a final agreement); Intershoe, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 571 N.E.2d 641, 643–44 (N.Y. 
1991) (same); Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 647  (N.Y. 1928) (upholding the “four corners” 
presumption and excluding evidence of collateral agreement to land sale contract).  In addition, 
merger clauses are given virtually conclusive effect in New York.  See Tempo Shain Corp. v. 
Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Ordinarily, a merger clause provision indicates 
that the subject agreement is completely integrated, and parol evidence is precluded from 
altering or interpreting the agreement.”); Norman Bobrow & Co. v. Loft Realty Co., 577 
N.Y.S.2d 36, 36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (“Parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of 
a written contract containing a merger clause.”). 
9.  See cases cited infra note 11. 
10.  The UCC adopts a broadly contextualist approach to interpretation.  See U.C.C. §§ 1-
303 cmt. 1, 2-202 cmts. 1(b), 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).  Article 2 of the 
UCC, adopted in all states except Louisiana, governs all “transactions in goods.”  Id. § 2-102. 
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contract.11  Thus the battle is joined: text versus context.12 
This battle over contract interpretation—which is better, text or 
context?—illustrates the deep chasm that separates the scholarly debates 
over contract doctrine from the real world of contract design.  Contract 
doctrine purports to address a single question: What should courts do?  
Should a court adopt a hard or a soft parol evidence rule?  Does the 
 
11.  Contextualists argue that formal interpretive rules excluding certain categories of 
extrinsic evidence deprive the fact finder of indispensable information relevant to deciding the 
case and thus can distort the court’s assessment of what the parties meant by their agreement.  
Contextualist jurisdictions, such as California, carry this view to its logical limit and reject the 
notion that words in a contract can have a plain or unambiguous—context-free—meaning at 
all.  By the same logic, they favor a “soft” parol evidence rule.  Here the test for integration 
admits extrinsic evidence notwithstanding an unambiguous merger clause declaring the 
contract to be an integrated writing or, absent such a clause, notwithstanding the fact that the 
writing appears final and complete on its face.  Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage 
& Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645 (Cal. 1968) (“[R]ational interpretation requires at least a 
preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the 
parties.”); Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (admitting parol evidence to vary 
terms of deed on ground that “[e]vidence of oral collateral agreements should be excluded only 
when the fact finder is likely to be misled”); see also Int’l Milling Co. v. Hachmeister, Inc., 110 
A.2d 186 (Pa. 1955) (finding extrinsic evidence of negotiations and antecedent agreements 
admissible to show that buyer had not assented to the contract as a complete integration of the 
contract, despite the presence of an express merger clause); 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE RULES OF CONTRACT LAW 
§ 578 (1960) (“The fact that a written document contains one of these express provisions does 
not prove that the document itself was ever assented to or ever became operative as a contract.  
Neither does it exclude evidence that the document was not in fact assented to and therefore 
never became operative.”). 
12.  The scholarly debate is both heated and voluminous.  Textualist scholars emphasize 
the importance of bespoke design of contracts and minimize the role of courts in reassessing 
that design in litigation.  For discussion, see Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design 
and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023 (2009); Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1475 (2010) 
(concluding that “[t]he revealed preferences of sophisticated parties support arguments by 
Schwartz, Scott, and others that formalistic rules offer superior value for the interpretation and 
enforcement of commercial contracts”); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2; Alan Schwartz & 
Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926 (2010).  For the 
contextualist, willfully restricting a court’s access to the trove of information bearing on the 
parties’ real relationship degrades judicial interpretation and frustrates these parties’ efforts to 
govern their transactions efficiently.  For a sampling of the contextualist scholarship supporting 
this view, see generally Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and 
Modern Economic Formalism in Contract Law, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 943 (2009); James W. 
Bowers, Murphy’s Law and the Elementary Theory of Contract Interpretation: A Response to 
Schwartz and Scott, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 587 (2005); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs. 
Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for 
Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43 (2007–2008).  Steven Burton has developed an intermediate view 
that admits of some sources of extrinsic evidence but excludes other.  See, e.g., STEVEN J. 
BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION (2009); Steven J. Burton, A Lesson on 
Some Limits of Economic Analysis: Schwartz and Scott on Contract Interpretation, 88 IND. L.J. 
339 (2013). 
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common law plain meaning rule still apply?  Are merger clauses 
conclusive evidence that the writing is integrated?13  But the design 
choices lawyers make for their commercial clients are motivated by quite 
different considerations.  Transactional lawyers who design contracts for 
sophisticated parties are much more concerned with managing the role of 
a court in resolving contract disputes than in debates over styles of 
interpretation.  And, as I will argue, designing a contract that successfully 
manages the court’s role is not an easy task. 
My goal in this Article is to shift the focus of discussion from the 
potential generalization of (competing) doctrinal prototypes to what I call 
the design space for contracting: key features in the transactional 
environment that incline contracting parties to choose a particular regime 
and a complementary form of adjudication to govern their relationship.  
Across this space, we observe parties writing contracts with very different 
styles and forms.  The question, then, is this: What motivates these 
observable and predictable differences in contract design?  In the 
discussion that follows, I argue that a central objective motivating 
sophisticated parties in each of these environments is to reduce the 
anticipated opportunism costs that are inherent in ex post adjudication of 
breach of contract claims.14  The task is difficult because exogenous 
factors will determine which party is likely to behave opportunistically, 
and any effort to design the contract to preclude one party from asserting 
an opportunistic claim inevitably increases the risk of strategic behavior 
by the counterparty.15  The design challenge is compounded by the fact 
that opportunistic behavior, in whatever form and by whatever party, is 
very difficult to discover during the litigation process.  Hence, the 
ultimate design goal is to avoid handing a generalist court an interpretive 
task that the court is unlikely to be able to perform successfully. 
Drawing on earlier work with Ronald Gilson and Charles Sabel,16 I 
 
13.  For a discussion of the ways common law courts address these various questions, see 
ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 537–42, 588–95 (5th ed. 
2013). 
14.  While I will argue that a central purpose of contract design is to reduce the costs 
associated with opportunistic behavior stimulated by contract disputes (particularly disputes 
over the meaning of the contract), I do not mean, thereby, to suggest that this is the only 
purpose of contract design.  Clearly, parties also design contracts so as to maintain both parties’ 
opportunities and incentives to realize gains from the relationship over time.  It is the case, 
however, that maintaining the relationship requires a contractual design that reduces the 
incentives for either party to advance strategic claims during litigation.  See generally 
Kostritsky, supra note 12. 
15.  See, e.g., id. at 72. 
16.  In previous work, my co-authors Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel, and I have assessed 
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sketch a typology illustrating the wide range of design options 
sophisticated parties can use to cope with the risk of strategic behavior in 
litigation.  There are two crucial characteristics of the contracting 
environment that influence how these parties design their contracts.  The 
first is the level of uncertainty—whether commercial practices are stable 
and predictable, or, alternatively, are continuously disrupted by 
unforeseeable changes in technical possibilities and market conditions.17  
All else equal, the higher the level of uncertainty, the more difficult it is 
for parties to write complete, state-contingent contracts and the greater 
the challenge for courts to interpret the parties’ instructions correctly.  
The second crucial characteristic is the scope, thickness, or scale of the 
market—whether there are many traders or only a few engaged in a 
particular class of transaction using similar contracting strategies.18  All 
else equal, the greater the number of traders engaged in a transaction, the 
more likely that the contractual regime—terms adapted to current need 
and a mechanism for adjusting terms as needs change—will be provided 
by a collective entity, such as a trade association, and disputes arising 
under it are likely to be resolved by a specialized arbitral body.19  By 
 
how two key factors—uncertainty and scale—shape how contracting parties deal with a 
particular manifestation of uncertainty: the need to change existing contracting practices in 
order to respond to new circumstances created by changes in the economic environment.  See 
generally Gilson, Sable & Scott, supra note 3; Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. 
Scott, Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel 
Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 170, 172–74 (2013). 
17.  It is commonplace to follow Frank Knight and distinguish between risk—the 
likelihood of an event that can be estimated probabilistically—and uncertainty—the likelihood 
of whose occurrence, or even whether it could happen at all, is unknown.  FRANK H. KNIGHT, 
RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921); see also Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert 
E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 433 n.2 (2009).  Any particular transaction will present elements of both 
risk and uncertainty but in different proportions.  I will treat the term “low uncertainty” as 
covering situations in which probabilistic assessments can be made in important respects, and 
I will use the term “high uncertainty” for circumstances where probabilistic assessments are of 
little consequence.  Thus, a high level of uncertainty exists when exogenous events that may 
affect the parties’ obligations to perform are unknown or cannot be estimated probabilistically.  
In contrast, under conditions of low uncertainty, sophisticated parties can identify the relevant 
risks that may impede future performance, estimate their occurrence probabilistically, and 
allocate those risks in the resulting agreement.  For a helpful discussion of how the incomplete 
foresight associated with Knightian uncertainty is central to institutional (contractual) design, 
see Rudolph Richter, Efficiency of Institutions: From the Perspective of New Institutional 
Economics with Emphasis on Knightian Uncertainty 17–21 (July 13, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2105604 [http://perma.cc/C5UU-X4PV]. 
18.  A thick market is one in which many commercial actors are exchanging goods or 
services by using the same or similar contracting behaviors and strategies.  Hence the 
contracting is multilateral.  In thin markets, the contracting is bilateral. 
19.  Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 16, at 176–79. 
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deploying sophisticated design strategies tailored to these particular 
environments, parties are able both to reduce the risk of opportunism and 
to cabin the role of the decision maker tasked with policing this difficult-
to-verify behavior. 
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part II, I focus on a neglected area 
of legal scholarship: What explains why parties breach their contracts?  
Here I develop a novel variation on opportunism that I identify as 
“shading,” a behavior that more accurately describes the vexing problems 
courts face in rooting out strategic behavior in contract litigation.  Part III 
provides some empirical support for the claim that shading behavior is 
both pervasive in litigation over contract breach and extremely difficult 
for generalist courts to detect and offers an explanation for why this is so.  
Part IV addresses history to show that in pre-industrial England 
generalist courts, in contrast to today, were better able to police shading 
behavior.  The merger of law and equity together with the growing 
heterogeneity of the modern global economy has left generalist courts 
incapable of identifying, with any degree of accuracy, who among the 
litigants is behaving strategically. 
Finally in Part V, I focus on the critical roles of uncertainty and scale 
in determining how legally sophisticated parties, both individually and 
collectively, design their contracts.  Here I advance the claim that, in each 
of the environments that make up the design space for contracting, ex ante 
design by commercial parties is a more effective means of deterring 
opportunism than is ex post evaluation of the contractual context by 
generalist courts.  By deploying sophisticated design strategies tailored to 
particular environments, parties are able to cabin (and thereby render 
more effective) the role of the decision maker tasked with policing 
difficult-to-verify shading behavior. 
II. WHY DO CONTRACTING PARTIES BREACH? 
The fundamental challenge for lawyers in designing a contract is that 
contractual obligations are agreed to ex ante (at the time the contract is 
formed) but are enforced ex post (after the transaction has broken down 
and parties are litigating).  Because courts have the benefit of hindsight, 
the ex post world sometimes, though not always, resolves the 
uncertainties of ex ante contracting.  In order to resolve those 
uncertainties, however, courts must be empowered to interpret contract 
terms.  But here is the rub: The invitation to interpret the agreement 
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creates an opportunity for a mulligan,20 a “do-over,” where either party 
can behave strategically.  The party who is disappointed by subsequent 
events may argue that the contract as written does not fully reflect the 
parties’ true agreement, and conversely, the party who was blessed by fate 
may argue that the contract as written is exactly what the parties intended 
even though it appears in hindsight to lead to unreasonable results.21  
Anticipating this problem, the challenge for contract design is to choose 
between two very different options: either to expend additional drafting 
and negotiating costs in order to devise innovative contract terms that 
reduce the likelihood of future strategic behavior or to postpone those 
costs and delegate discretion to a later court to root out and deter this 
strategic behavior once litigation arises. 
There are several reasons why contract law doctrine does not provide 
any guidance on how best to respond to this challenge, but one in 
particular stands out: Contract law scholars have neglected one of the 
most significant reasons why parties are found to be in breach of their 
contracts.  The difficulty starts with a misspecification of the problem.  It 
is incorrect to think of contract breach as either the actions (or inactions) 
of one party who thereby fails to perform its contractual obligations 
satisfactorily.  Properly understood, breach does not follow automatically 
from the alleged non-performance of one of the parties to the contract.  
Rather, breach is the legal conclusion reached by a court after it has 
assessed the actions of both parties.22  So let’s ask the question more 
precisely.  Given the coercive power of the state to enforce contracts and 
award compensatory damages, why do parties ever act in ways that lead 
courts to declare a breach?  There are three major explanations.  First, 
many actions that lead to breach are inadvertent; that is, parties are held 
in breach because they are unable to provide a timely and conforming 
performance.  For our purposes it does not matter why—it could be 
failures in production, supply, or any other of a host of exogenous shocks 
that prevent full and complete performance.  In any event, inadvertent 
breach does not implicate contract design (at least not directly). 
 
20.  A “mulligan” is a second chance to perform an action, usually after the first chance 
went wrong through bad luck or a blunder. 
21.  See Kenneth Ayotte, Ezra Friedman & Henry E. Smith, A Safety Valve Model of 
Equity as Anti-Opportunism (Nw. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 13-15, Mar. 30, 2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2245098 [http://perma.cc/AZ73-7UJV]. 
22.  In litigation there is only one breacher, and that party frequently loses the entire 
benefit of its bargain by sacrificing what may have been extremely valuable return rights in the 
contract.  I have elsewhere identified this as “the breacher-status” problem.  See Charles J. 
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual 
Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 983–84 (1983). 
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What about advertent (or purposive) actions that result in a breach of 
contract judgment?  Here there are two candidates.  One hypothesis can 
be traced rather directly to an article that Charles Goetz and I wrote 
thirty-five years ago.23  Developing an idea first suggested by Robert 
Birmingham in 196924 and further developed by Richard Posner in 1972,25 
we coined the phrase “efficient breach.”  Efficient breach theory was 
based on the premise that a contractual obligation is not necessarily an 
obligation to perform but rather an obligation to choose between 
performance and compensatory damages.  Goetz and I explained the 
standard default rule of expectation damages by hypothesizing that 
“breach will occur where the breaching party anticipates that paying 
compensation and allocating his resources to alternative uses will make 
him ‘better off’ than performing his obligation.”26  It was a nice try but, in 
fact, the theory does not fit the data very well.  There are very few 
examples in the case law of an efficient breach in which one party has 
chosen not to perform and instead offered to pay the expectation 
damages that are subsequently assessed by a court.27  What commercial 
 
23.  Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just 
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient 
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. Rev. 554 (1977). 
24.  Robert L. Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The Geometry 
of Contract Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 49. 
25.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.9 (2d ed. 1972). 
26.  Goetz & Scott, supra note 23, at 558. 
27.  A variant on the idea of efficient breach that I have offered elsewhere is to shift the 
focus to “efficient salvage.”  This analysis focuses on the question: which party has the 
advantage in acquiring substitute goods in an imperfect market? 
Once a regret contingency has occurred, the promisor has two principal options: (1) 
perform the contract notwithstanding the contingency and accept any corresponding 
losses or (2) breach the contract and pay a compensatory damage award.  Since the 
disappointed promisor will bear the full cost of the choice between “perform and 
lose” and “breach and pay,” she is motivated to choose the least costly option.  Thus, 
if a seller believes that she can cover more cheaply than the buyer, she will simply 
purchase substitute goods on her own initiative and perform her obligation by 
supplying the substitute goods.  (In such a case, the buyer may never know there was 
ever a problem with the seller’s performance.)  Indeed, there are strong incentives for 
most sellers to select the ‘perform and lose’ option and not to breach. . . . 
 Thus, given the fact that the law requires compensation for breach, why would any 
seller ever breach?  One possible explanation is that the seller might breach when she 
determines that the buyer is better able to cover on the market and thus reduce the 
seller’s anticipated losses on the contract.  Breach, under this conception, is a “cry for 
help” by the seller.  It is a request for the buyer to salvage the broken contract at least 
cost and to send the seller the damage bill. 
SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 13, at 113–15. 
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parties do who wish to reserve an option on the contract performance is 
to stipulate in the contract an exercise price for the option to terminate 
and walk away from the contemplated exchange.  The option may take 
the form of “break up” fees, a stipulated damages clause, or a term that 
permits one party to terminate, cancel, return, or redeem goods.28  What 
parties do not do, however, is to leave the exercise price to be determined 
at the discretion of a court following a declaration of contract breach.  In 
that sense, efficient breach is both a null set as well as an oxymoron.  So, 
while we meant well, Goetz and I are probably primarily responsible for 
leading a generation of scholars down the wrong garden path.29 
Does this mean that the data show there is no such thing as an 
advertent breach in the sense of a conscious action that is later found by 
a court to be a breach of a promise to perform?  Not at all!  There are 
literally hundreds of cases where parties have been found by a court to 
have consciously breached their obligations under the contract.  The 
interesting thing about these cases, however, is that “breach” is not the 
result of a rational choice between the alternatives of undertaking a 
performance that costs more than it is worth or paying equally costly 
compensatory damages.  Rather, it is a conclusion reached by a court 
following a trial in which both parties insisted that their behavior was 
entirely proper under the contract.  So what is going on here? 
One possibility is that one of the partieslet’s call him “the doofus”—
is simply miscalculating the kind of performance the contract requires.  If 
so, then the party’s actions are merely inadvertent, the product of a 
mistaken judgment, and thus are no different from any other error that 
prevents a party from performing as promised.  A second—much more 
likely—possibility, however, is that the dispute occurs because one of the 
parties is welching on the deal.  If we knew which party was behaving 
strategically, we might well be tempted to label this latter behavior as 
opportunism.  Indeed, Ken Ayotte, Ezra Friedman, and Henry Smith 
have recently argued that the risk of opportunistic breach is sufficiently 
acute that courts should zealously police against opportunism by 
 
28.  For discussion see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the 
Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. Rev. 1428 (2004). 
29.  The theory of efficient breach has stimulated a veritable cottage industry of scholarly 
articles over the ensuing years.  For a review of the literature, as well as an argument that the 
choice between performance and the payment of compensatory damages is not properly 
characterized as a choice whether to breach efficiently but rather should be understood as a 
choice between alternative ways to perform the contract, see Daniel Markovits & Alan 
Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 1939 (2011). 
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deploying their traditional equity powers to punish an opportunistic party 
even in the face of a fully integrated and unambiguous written contract.30  
They contend that this heightened risk of opportunism undermines any 
argument that sophisticated parties are better equipped to deal with the 
risk of opportunism in advance through rational contract design.  
Contrary to the views of these scholars, however, I am going to defend 
the view that reliance on contract design is, in fact, a better approach.  My 
claim is that what the proponents of a return to traditional equity believe 
can be done as a matter of theory, generalist courts, in fact, cannot do (at 
least not reliably). 
Let’s begin with the concept of opportunism.  Oliver Williamson 
famously defined opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile.”31  But 
that characterization isn’t quite right here: As it appears initially to the 
court, both of the contracting parties are guileless.  Thus, we need to sort 
the behavior of the honest but mistaken breacher (who is not an 
opportunist to be sanctioned by a court using its equity powers) from 
behavior that is, in fact, self-interested but appears completely guileless.  
So, let’s call the latter behavior that I am describing “shading,” as in 
shading the truth.  My hypothesis is that both the parties and the courts 
face a fundamental dilemma: First, that shading behavior is ubiquitous, 
and second, that it is nearly impossible for a court to sort out who is the 
doofus and who is the shader.  In the following parts of the Article, I try 
to defend both of these propositions. 
III. WHY IS SHADING PERVASIVE AND UNDETECTABLE? 
Why is it that shading is so pervasive?  There are several reasons, but 
most important is the fact that all contracts—even those carefully drafted 
in every detail—must be interpreted.  Even if the interpretation is by a 
formalist court that relies on the parol evidence and plain meaning rules 
to limit its inquiry to the text of the agreement and its plain language, the 
court is still required to harmonize and make coherent a contract with 
over one hundred individual provisions, each of which may be 
unambiguous when viewed in isolation but subject to interpretation when 
taken together.  This means that all contracts depend on courts to 
implement correctly the ex ante instructions the parties have embedded 
in their agreement.32  Those instructions can be framed either as “hard” 
 
30.  Ayotte, Friedman & Smith, supra note 21. 
31.  Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233, 234 (1979). 
32.  The state’s general rules of contract provide a set of standard gap-filling assumptions 
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terms (precise, bright-line rules) or as “soft” terms (broad standards) or, 
more often, as combinations of the two.  But whether hard or soft, one 
party or the other will obtain a significant ex post advantage whenever 
there is a substantial exogenous shock between the time of contracting 
and the time of performance.33  Thus, if the contract terms are hard, the 
party with the apparent benefit of a bright-line rule, anticipating an 
interpretation in its favor, can extort rents in return for agreeing to adjust 
its behavior in ways that would reduce the ex post losses of the 
counterparty.  (Let’s call this Type I shading.)  In light of the problem that 
hard terms can work an injustice to the party who has been disadvantaged 
by fate, many scholars have argued that courts should imply broad 
standards of reasonableness or good-faith adjustment to moderate the 
effects of the bright-line obligation that subsequently proves so vexing.34  
But this strategy merely shifts the advantage to the counterparty.  
Substituting a soft standardsuch as good-faith adjustmentfor the hard 
rule merely creates a moral hazard risk on the other side, inviting a losing 
party to exploit the court’s discretion by persuading it to reallocate losses 
that were in fact allocated to the losing party by the contract (call this 
Type II shading).35 
Shading is not only pervasive but it is also difficult to detect.  Often 
the shader is entirely sincere in her belief that she has complied with the 
contract and that it is the counterparty who is the breacher.  There are 
two related but distinct phenomena here.  The first is the “noisy prisoner’s 
dilemma” problem: It is very difficult for parties engaged in iterative acts 
of performance to interpret correctly the behaviors of their counterparty.  
A cooperative action can often be misinterpreted as a defection and vice 
 
or default rules.  But every contract requires the parties to provide some additional 
individualized content.  These combinations of express terms and default terms operate on two 
distinct levels.  On one level, they serve as an attempted interparty communication of the risks 
and entitlements being exchanged.  On another level, these terms, in combination, 
communicate evidence of the contractual understanding to the state.  Thus, they are signals of 
the legal relationship between the parties.  Unfortunately, these signals are inherently error-
prone.  For discussion, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: 
An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 
261 (1985). 
33.  See Goetz & Scott, supra note 22, at 977–81. 
34.  E.g., Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis 
Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1; Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of 
Contract, 2 J.L. & COM. 193 (1982) Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments 
Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 NW. U.L. REV. 369 (1981). 
35.  Soft terms such as “good faith adjustment” remain as intractably ambiguous to judges 
as to the parties themselves, especially since the promisor can act strategically in establishing 
the facts and in persuading the court what “good faith” should entail. 
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versa.  This can lead to sincere but mistaken retaliation against a 
perceived breach of trust.36  Second, there is a phenomenon that every 
good commercial lawyer understands: The behavioral reality is that 
agreeing before the fact to bear a low-probability, long-tail risk is quite a 
different matter from being willing to absorb the entire cost of the event 
once the risk materializes.  The prospect of suffering large ex post losses 
can produce a form of cognitive amnesia in which both parties are 
convinced that their behavior is perfectly consistent with their contractual 
obligations.  To be sure, a party’s claim of compliance may be blatantly 
strategic, in which case the court will be confronted with a self-conscious 
opportunist in shader’s clothing.  But in any event, there is no “breach” 
in any meaningful sense of the word unless and until a court—acting as a 
refereeassesses the evidence and makes a call. 
One might be tempted at this juncture to turn to relational contract 
theory and ask whether norms of trust, reciprocity, and the desire to 
preserve one’s reputation will deter shading on the margin and avoid the 
problem altogether.37  But relationships built on trust alone are little help 
in this situation.  Contract disputes of this sort present an end game, “bet 
the ranch” situation in which the relationship will come to an end one way 
or the other, so the shader has little to lose.  Moreover, even if contracting 
parties are willing to punish selfish or unfair actions by their counterparty, 
as the behavioral research suggests,38 this won’t deter shading either.  As 
 
36.  Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CALIF. L. 
REV. 2005, 2031 (1987). 
37.  When parties choose formal contract, they enlist the state through the judicial system 
to assess the performance of their specified rights and obligations and impose remedies in the 
event of breach.  Alternatively, parties can enforce the agreement informally by their actions 
alone without judicial intervention.  In this case, performance is encouraged and breach 
penalized by the cancellation of expected future dealings with the counterparty, by the loss of 
reputation (with the resulting reduction in future business with other potential counterparties 
in the relevant economic and social communities), or by an individual taste for reciprocity that 
rewards cooperation and punishes defection.  See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: 
The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444, 449–50 (1996); 
Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An Institutional 
Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981).  An excellent survey of early 
informal enforcement mechanisms is Avner Greif, Informal Contract Enforcement: Lessons 
from Medieval Trade, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 
287 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).  For discussion of how iterative interactions between parties to 
long-term contracts can create a stable equilibrium of enforceable obligations in the absence of 
a substantial exogenous shock, see Scott, supra note 36, at 2027–30. 
38.  See, e.g., Ernst Fehr, Alexander Klein & Klaus M. Schmidt, Fairness and Contract 
Design, 75 ECONOMETRICA 121 (2007); Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, Adding a Stick to the 
Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 177 (2007); Ernst Fehr, 
Georg Kirchsteiger & Arno Riedl, Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental 
Markets, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 1 (1998). 
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I have suggested, both parties see themselves as behaving fairly under the 
circumstances and, therefore, feel that their actions are fully justified. 
So what is a court supposed to do?  As I mentioned earlier, several 
scholars have recently argued for a return to traditional equity.  On this 
view, courts would make a Solomonic determination of who is the likely 
opportunistic party and impose sanctions independently of what the 
contract appears to require.39  But before we endorse that approach, we 
must first answer a key empirical question: Can generalist courts find the 
shaders among the doofuses?  To begin to answer that question, I 
assembled a data set of seventy-five randomly selected contract disputes 
where the issue before the court was “who breached the contract”?  I 
tested two hypotheses.  First, that disputes in which a party could 
plausibly be guilty of either Type I or Type II shading are common.  
Second, that courts in such cases would not (or could not) reliably identify 
behavior as opportunistic.  The hypothesis that shading disputes are 
frequent is a function of the fact that disputes of this sort often require a 
third party to resolve.  The second hypothesis rests on the claim that 
generalist courts lack the resources required to understand the underlying 
context of the transaction and uncover subtle forms of aberrant behavior. 
Conceding that there is a considerable amount of judgment involved 
in my coding of the cases, the tentative findings are consistent with both 
hypotheses.  Of the sixty-six unique cases, fifty-four plausibly contained 
either Type I or Type II shading.  Of these fifty-four cases, self-interested 
behavior was alleged in twenty cases.  Of these twenty cases, the deciding 
court found one party to be behaving opportunistically in only two 
instances.40  To be sure, these results are only suggestive.  These courts 
 
39.  See Ayotte, Friedman & Smith, supra note 21. 
40.  The empirical exercise examined a sample of cases for consistency with the two 
hypotheses.  Searches for “Contract Breach Ambiguity,” “Contract Breach Mistake,” and 
“Contract Breach Plain Meaning” from “All State” and “All Federal” cases on Westlaw 
produced a population of over ten thousand cases.  A random sample of seventy-five cases was 
selected from this population.  The cases produced by each search term were first sorted by 
relevance.  Starting with the first case from each list, every fourth case was selected for the 
sample for a total of twenty-five of the one hundred most relevant cases (i.e., cases one, five, 
nine . . . ninety-seven).  Conducting this procedure for each of the three search terms produced 
a sample of seventy-five cases.  Of these seventy-five cases, there were sixty-six unique cases.  
The sixty-six cases were coded for (1) if Type I or Type II shading was a plausibly component 
of the suit, (2) express or inferred claims by one party that the counterparty was behaving 
strategically, and (3) if the court found that one party was indeed acting opportunistically.  Each 
case was then categorized as Category One (shading is plausible), Category Two (shading is 
plausible and strategic behavior was alleged), or Category Three (shading is plausible, strategic 
behavior was alleged, and the court found opportunistic behavior).  See cases cited in 
Appendix. 
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could be resolving the doofus/shader determination sub rosa but are 
declining to identify it explicitly.  Moreover, in six of the cases where self-
interested behavior was alleged, the courts were just deciding appeals 
from summary judgment or motions to dismiss and did not address the 
issue of opportunistic behavior.  But for those who hope that generalist 
courts can deter opportunistic behavior in litigation, the judicial silence 
gives us, at best, a very noisy signal. 
There are other data that support the hypothesis that generalist courts 
are poor candidates for using their equity powers to reduce the incidences 
of opportunism.  One line of analysis shows the difficulty of measuring 
allegedly opportunistic behavior against the norms and customs of the 
relevant trading community.  Recent research on the medieval law 
merchant by Emily Kadens and Lisa Bernstein’s extensive research on 
20th century trade associations have shown that ongoing, “traditional” 
dealings never crystalize into well-defined, customary usages of trade at 
all.41  This evidence suggests that many courts, when asked to identify a 
trade usage, rely exclusively on interested party testimony rather than on 
a careful evaluation of complex evidentiary submissions.  For example, 
evidence of a usage of trade as to the reasonable time for delivery of the 
contract product may turn on the testimony of the plaintiff’s warehouse 
manager that shipments usually arrive within three days.  In short, there 
is virtually no evidence that courts undertake the kind of empirical 
investigations needed to find a relevant custom and then use the resulting 
norm to identify opportunistic behavior—and even less reason to imagine 
that they could succeed if they did.42  Long-term, reciprocal relations 
 
41.  See Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 
1176–77 (2012); Lisa Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts: The Flawed Conceptual and 
Evidentiary Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy 18–21 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & 
Econ., Working Paper No. 669, 2014) [hereinafter Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts], 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2366533 [http://perma.cc/Z4JM-49VK] (analyzing empirical evidence 
showing courts typically rely on unreliable evidence to establish usages); Lisa Bernstein, 
Merchant Law in a Modern Economy 9–12 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 639, 2013) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern Economy], 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2242490 [http://perma.cc/JB6T-TJVN]. 
42.  As a number of scholars have noted, the “incorporation mechanism” introduced into 
the UCC by Karl Llewellyn has not functioned as he intended.  See, e.g., James Whitman, 
Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn’s German Sources for the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156, 174–75 (1987).  Llewellyn believed that 
customary practice had only an epistemological and not also a normative relevance.  His 
reservations about generalist courts were similar to those advanced here, and he was thus 
unwilling to rely solely on judicial intuitions to undertake what was essentially an empirical 
inquiry.  As a consequence, he proposed a mechanism by which these local norms could be 
identified by courts: The merchant tribunal was a panel of experts that would find specific 
facts—such as whether the behavior of a contracting party was “commercially reasonable” in 
 2015] CONTRACT DESIGN AND THE SHADING PROBLEM 17 
always reflect the idiosyncrasies of the histories of each party with the 
others in the trading community, and these idiosyncrasies prevent the 
community’s practice from settling into a determinate custom or practice.  
Thus, even if generalist courts were better equipped for empirical 
investigation than they normally are, there would typically be no custom-
based, context-embedded usage or practice for them to discover and use 
in evaluating a litigating party’s actions.43 
Here, then, is the dilemma: enforcing contracts requires 
interpretation, which means the courts are asked to first identify and then 
to police shading behavior, but attempting to perform these tasks often 
leads to errors because the courts are asked to do more than they are able 
to do.44  Left to their own devices, courts either will intervene too much 
or too little.  So, what is the alternative?  How do we get just the right 
amount of judicial policing of contracts?  My argument is that 
sophisticated contracting parties and their lawyers can, and in fact do, 
design their contracts in ways that invite a court to perform this policing 
function only when the court is likely to get the question right. 
IV. POLICING SHADING AT COMMON LAW 
But before we look at the ways contemporary commercial parties 
design contracts that minimize the shading problem, we should remember 
that the problem was not always this severe.  At early common law, the 
shading problem was contained by virtue of the historic division of roles 
between law and equity.45  Historically, the English common law applied 
two different sets of doctrines to interpret a disputed contract.  The first 
consisted of rulessuch as the parol evidence and plain meaning 
rulesthat were cast in objective terms that minimized the need for 
subjective judgment in their application.  They were administered strictly, 
 
the context of the particular dispute.  But the abandonment of the merchant tribunal in the face 
of opposition by members of the bar doomed this effort from the start.  Imad D. Abyad, Note, 
Commercial Reasonableness in Karl Llewellyn’s Uniform Commercial Code Jurisprudence, 83 
VA. L. REV. 429, 452 (1997) (“The courts in effect are abrogating the responsibility that the 
Code drafters assigned to them by treating commercial reasonableness as garden-variety 
reasonableness, left for the lay juries to decide on a case-by-case basis with no systematic 
structure resulting from their decisions.”); Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts, supra note 41, 
at 20–21 (empirical evidence shows courts typically rely on unreliable evidence to establish 
usages). 
43.  See Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 118 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt 
eds., 2000). 
44.  See Goetz & Scott, supra note 32, at 271–72. 
45.  The discussion in this part draws on Kraus & Scott, supra note 12, at 1035–45. 
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without exceptions for cases in which the application of a rule appeared 
to defeat its purpose.  These doctrines originated in the first seven 
centuries of adjudication in King’s Bench and Common Pleas, the English 
courts that produced the corpus of the common law from the twelfth to 
the nineteenth centuries.46  The second set of doctrines consisted largely 
of equitable principles originating in the English Court of Chancery, 
which, by the end of the fourteenth century, began to exercise 
overlapping jurisdiction with the common law courts and to hear cases 
that in “the ordinary course of law failed to provide justice.”47  These 
doctrines were framed as broad principles administered loosely and were 
designed to provide exceptions to the common law interpretive rules.  
They were generally cast in subjective terms and, therefore, required 
judges to exercise judgment by evaluating the fairness or the “equities” 
of the particular transaction. 
The Chancery’s willingness to provide an independent and alternative 
forum stemmed from the perception that the common law courts were 
incapable of policing opportunism because of the strict, rule-bound 
inclination of common law judges to apply the common law rigorously 
without reference to the context of the case at hand.48  The Chancery’s 
sole focus in contrast was with the equities of the case at bar.  Indeed, for 
many years the Chancery’s decrees had no formal precedential effect, 
which initially freed the Chancery from any concern that its context-
specific rulings could undermine the consistency and predictability of 
contracting.49  And, important for our purposes, there was one key 
 
46.  J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 12–14 (4th ed. 2007). 
47.  Id. at 117.  If parties had complaints that did not fit within the confines of existing 
forms of action, they could petition the King.  Even though the King’s Bench and Common 
Pleas courts were created by statute, the King retained authority to hear cases in which he 
believed the common law was “deficient.”  In exceptional cases, the King took action by 
granting a remedy as of grace.  As these “exceptional” private suits became more common, 
they were referred to the King’s council.  Later, parties addressed their bills directly to the 
Chancellor, who, under the authority of the council, took responsibility for assigning them to 
appropriate courts for resolution.  Id. at 117. 
48.  Id. at 104.  In its earliest incarnation, the procedure in Chancery was the antithesis of 
the procedure in common law courts: no writ was necessary, multiple issues could be joined, 
evidence was taken free of formal rules, decisions were made by chancellor rather than a jury, 
the court was always open, and trials could take place anywhere (including the Chancellor’s 
home).  Id. at 103–04. 
49.  “In Chancery each case turned on its own facts, and the chancellor did not interfere 
with the general rules observed in courts of law.  The decrees operated in personam; they were 
binding on the parties in the cause, but were not judgments of record binding anyone else.”  Id. 
at 104.  “So long as chancellors were seen as providing ad hoc remedies in individual cases, 
there was no question of their jurisdiction bringing about legal change or making law.”  Id. at 
202. 
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additional factor: In pre-industrial England, the Chancery was more 
intimately familiar with the contextual environment of typical party 
disputes and could fairly sort relevant from irrelevant facts.  Thus even 
though the Chancery reversed or avoided outcomes dictated by the 
interpretive rules, these actions could be seen as necessary in order to 
vindicate, rather than undermine, the common law. 
Fundamentally, however, the institutions of the common law and the 
Chancery were at cross-purposes.  The result was two competing systems, 
often with incompatible procedural and substantive doctrines yet 
overlapping in jurisdiction.50  The ultimate result of the merger of law and 
equity meant that the institutional framework of the state could no longer 
by itself solve the shading problem.  In consequence, commercial parties 
today are likely to be poorly served if they choose to rely on subjective, 
equitable review by contemporary courts.  Lacking the requisite 
specialization, courts today are relatively ineffective at uncovering the 
underlying context that is essential if they are to police opportunism 
effectively.  In contrast to early courts of equity, when the courts were 
close to the actors in a largely homogenous economy, generalist courts 
today are removed from the enormously varied, commercial-contracting 
context in modern economies and, therefore, are critically impaired in 
their ability to divine how and when parties might seek to exploit the 
uncertainties of ex post interpretation. 
So, let’s abandon the ex post question that asks what contract 
doctrines best help courts determine when to intervene to deter 
opportunism.  Rather, let’s ask the question from the ex ante perspective: 
How can we design a contract that appropriately limits the risk of 
opportunism and thus properly confines the court’s role in supervising the 
contracting process? 
V. POLICING SHADING THROUGH CONTRACT DESIGN 
We return to the questions with which we began: How do 
sophisticated parties and their skilled transactional lawyersthe contract 
designers of this worldaddress the shading problem?  Is it possible to 
design a contract in which the court plays a superintending role that is 
sensitive to the context the parties have created?  Unfortunately, we have 
 
50.  Ironically, by the nineteenth century the Chancery had developed a set of procedures 
more arcane and burdensome than the common law procedures it originally sought to mitigate.  
The resulting administrative delay, combined with corruption born of the Chancery’s practice 
of paying clerks on a fee basis rather than salary, ultimately led to the Chancery’s demise.  Id. 
at 111–12.  Soon thereafter law and equity were merged.  Id. at 114. 
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only preliminary data to answer these questions because, as noted above, 
contract design remains something of a mystery largely neglected by both 
legal and economics scholars.  Indeed, there is a large and growing 
literature that demonstrates the resistance of contracts to change even in 
the face of a significant exogenous shock.  We know that boilerplate terms 
in corporate indentures, sovereign bonds, and other standard form 
contracts resist improvements that would appear to enhance contractual 
efficiency.51  Even customized, bespoke contracting emerges from law 
firm precedents that are tightly protected and resistant to amendment.  
Yet despite these impediments, contracts do change in many different 
ways, and the changes appear to be the product of intelligent design, 
perhaps aided by a quasi-Darwinian evolutionary process of trial and 
error.  Studies of contemporary commercial practices that my colleagues, 
Ron Gilson and Chuck Sabel, and I have undertaken over the past four 
years show that sophisticated parties choose several different means of 
anticipating and deterring shading behavior in the design of their 
contractual regimes.52 
To understand how contracts have evolved to address the shading 
problem (even as exogenous shocks alter the business environment in 
unpredictable ways), we should first begin by distinguishing two 
fundamental design categories.  The first and most common is 
customization or “tailoring” of familiar contractual formulations.  This 
involves changes in the terms within a particular instrument so as to better 
address particular uncertainties with future states.  Thus, for example, in 
the past fifty years, parties have increasingly inserted vague terms such as 
“best efforts,” “reasonable best efforts,” or “commercially reasonable 
efforts” as modifiers that are combined with specific or precise 
performance obligations under the contract.53  Another example of 
 
51.  See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE 
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (2013); see also Omri 
Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
651 (2006); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997). 
52.  See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 3; Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 16; Ronald 
J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal 
Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010); Gilson, Sabel 
& Scott, supra note 17. 
53.  At the time of contract formation, the parties have a comparative advantage over 
courts because the parties share the benefits of efficient contracting.  At the time of subsequent 
litigation, however, the court will have the benefit of hindsight.  Uncertainty has been resolved, 
and the court sees realized facts rather than probability distributions.  Because the parties 
cannot foresee all contingencies, they can delegate to the court the task of completing the 
contract ex post by considering relevant context.  They indicate this intention by adopting a 
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customization occurs in thick contractual markets where trade 
associations or other collective bodies use an updating mechanism 
external to the parties to propose changes in particular terms that will 
ultimately be adopted by most, if not all, members of the collective body.54 
A quite different design challenge has emerged, however, as a product 
of the enhanced uncertainty triggered by the “information revolution.”  
The changes in contract design that respond to the challenge of 
heightened uncertainty are innovative in a much more fundamental way: 
They involve mutations in the very form of a contractual agreement.  In 
this latter category we see radically incomplete contracts being used to 
create binding preliminary commitments,55 manage supply chains, 
structure complex platform production relationships, and build 
pharmaceutical alliances.56  Parties in this environment of enhanced 
uncertainty are doing something different, and we might surmise what 
they are doing is an effort to solve the shading problem in novel ways. 
The starting point for understanding these novel forms of contracting 
is to focus on two critical characteristics of any particular contracting 
environment.57  The first is the level of uncertainty—are commercial 
practices stable and predictable, or are they disrupted by unforeseeable 
changes in technical possibilities and market conditions?  All else equal, 
the higher the level of uncertainty, the more difficult it is for parties to 
write, and courts to interpret, completely specified and fully integrated 
contracts.  Rather, when the level of uncertainty is high, sophisticated 
parties develop agreements grounded in the commitment to a regular 
exchange of private information but with no commitment as to the 
product that this agreement will produce.58  The second characteristic is 
 
general contract term—a standard such as “best efforts”—that directs the court to recover that 
context evidence relevant to the particular obligation embedded in the contractually specified 
term.  With the aid of interpretation maxims, parties can design combinations of specific and 
vague terms that more precisely define the “space” within which the court has discretion.  Scott 
& Triantis, supra note 3. 
54.  See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1745–54 (2001) 
[hereinafter Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry]; Lisa Bernstein, 
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business 
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1771–77 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law]; Lisa 
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond 
Industry, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 115, 119–30 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Opting Out]. 
55.  See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary 
Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661 (2007). 
56.  Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 17, at 438–41. 
57.  The discussion in this part draws on Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 3. 
58.  My colleagues and I have previously described the character of the contracting 
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the scope or thickness of the market—whether there are many traders, or 
only a few, engaged in a particular class of transaction using similar 
contracting strategies.59  All else equal, the greater the number of traders 
engaged in a transaction, the more likely that the contract terms and the 
rules for their interpretation—as well as a mechanism for adjusting terms 
as needs change—will be provided by a collective entity, such as a trade 
association, that can then provide a court the necessary context for 
interpretation.  The interplay of these two forces—uncertainty and 
scale—points to the new forms of contracting among sophisticated parties 
and, at the same time, helps clarify the (often-overwhelming) institutional 
demands facing a generalist court asked to resolve competing claims by 
parties to these agreements. 
A. When Uncertainty is Low and the Market is Thin: The Case of the 
(Relatively) Complete Contingent Contract 
Uncertainty and scale together determine whether and how the 
contract in question deals successfully with the shading problem.  Begin 
with the case of thin markets where the key variable is the level of 
uncertainty: For example, think about the battle for evolving technology 
in the market for electronics.  Here the principal actors are few and 
scattered.  Thus, unlike, say, the grain industry, these parties cannot rely 
on a trade association to institutionalize their design solutions because 
 
problem facing parties in rapidly innovating industries with high levels of uncertainty: 
[T]he transactions governed by these contracts share a number of characteristics.  
First, the primary output is an innovative “product,” one whose characteristics, costs, 
and manufacture, because of uncertainty, cannot be specified ex ante.  Second, 
neither party alone has the capacity to specify and develop the product’s 
characteristics, costs, and methods of manufacture; hence, there must be 
collaboration among companies with different capabilities.  Third, the process of 
specification and development will be iterative: Individual design elements will 
depend on the recurrent input from those working upstream or downstream and from 
those working on other design elements.  Thus, central to these transactions are 
communication and cooperation across the two (or more) firms—the design, 
specification, and determination of manufacturing characteristics will be the result of 
repeated interactive collaborative efforts by employees of separate firms with distinct 
capabilities. 
Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 17, at 451 (footnote omitted). 
59.  A thick market is one in which many commercial actors are exchanging goods or 
services by using the same or similar contracting behaviors and strategies.  In this respect, 
similarity should be understood as a continuum.  Broadly similar transactions may still have 
significant idiosyncrasies, which will influence how a multilateral regime addresses markets that 
are thick at a general level and thinner with respect to particular transactions.  The polar 
opposite—a thin market—exists when each contracting party must negotiate a bespoke 
agreement with its counterparty.  Here contracting is bilateral. 
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the market is too thin.  In these circumstances, contract design occurs 
primarily in bilateral relationships, and here the level of uncertainty will 
determine how the parties respond to the problem of shading. 
When uncertainty is low—say, for example, a one-year license of 
patented electronic software—sophisticated parties can turn to 
customized, completely specified contracting.60  By incorporating any 
context thought to be relevant as part of the “terms” of a complete, 
formal agreement, they can specify precisely the evidentiary base that will 
be made available to a court while still preserving the court’s historic role 
in policing opportunism.  For example, the contract can provide clear 
directions to a court of the context within which the specified uses of the 
licensed intellectual property are to be interpreted.  This might include 
(a) a “whereas” or “purpose” clause that describes the parties’ business 
plans;61 (b) a series of definition clauses that ascribe particular meanings 
 
60.  The ideal for parties in this setting is to write a complete, state-contingent contract.  
Such a contract specifies ex ante the parties’ obligations in each possible ex post state of the 
world and is enforceable according to its terms, thereby assuring that performance occurs when, 
but only when, it is efficient.  But while complete, state-contingent contracts theoretically can 
address the tension between efficient ex ante investment and efficient ex post performance, the 
transaction costs of contracting frustrate this happy outcome.  Of particular importance are the 
information barriers that prevent parties from controlling moral hazard when the future states 
of the world depend on their own actions.  As a result, when the level of uncertainty is high, 
contracts will be incomplete because it simply costs too much (or may be impossible) for 
contracting parties to foresee and then describe appropriately the contractual outcomes for all 
(or even most) of the possible future states of the world that might materialize.  Not only is it 
costly to specify what should happen in different future states, but it is costly to prove what 
actually did happen.  Thus, both ex ante and ex post contracting costs prevent parties from 
writing complete, state-contingent contracts.  For discussion, see Gilson, Sable & Scott, supra 
note 17, at 452–53. 
61.  For example, see the following “purpose” clause from the Fountain Manufacturing 
Agreement between Apple Computer, Inc. and SCI Systems, Inc.: 
PURPOSE 
Apple and SCI entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement on April 4, 1996 (the “Stock 
Purchase Agreement”) pursuant to which SCI will purchase Apple’s manufacturing 
facility located at 702 Bandley Drive, Fountain, Colorado (“Fountain”) and certain 
related assets. 
The parties desire that Apple engage SCI to assemble, test and package certain 
Products, Service Units and Spare Parts, as defined below, on a turnkey basis at 
Fountain on the terms and conditions of this Agreement. 
This Agreement defines the general terms and conditions governing all transactions 
between them for Products, Service Units and Spare Parts manufactured at Fountain.  
Individual “Product Plans” attached as Addenda to this Agreement, and 
incorporated herein by reference, define the specific terms and conditions for each 
Product, Service Unit and/or Spare Part.  The initial Product Plans are attached to 
Exhibit A and numbered A-1 through A-11.  Additional Products and Product Plans 
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to words and terms that may vary from their plain or ordinary meaning;62 
and (c) appendices that provide illustrations or examples of the 
permissible uses of the licensed intellectual property as well as any 
memoranda the parties want a court to consider in interpreting the 
contract’s text.63  Alternatively, the parties can specify in the agreement 
that the meaning of terms should be interpreted according to the customs 
and norms of a particular industry or commercial community.  This 
additional context can supplement precise specifications of outcomes 
while still constraining a future court’s discretion to range more widely 
than the parties want ex ante. 
The point here is simply that low uncertainty permits parties to design 
a contract that dramatically reduces (if not eliminates) the need for courts 
to inquire into any evidence extrinsic to the written agreement.64  By 
reducing the burden on a court to characterize ex post shading behavior 
accurately, a (relatively) complete contingent contract also reduces the 
likelihood of a court’s making a mistake in interpreting the contract’s 
terms.  Correspondingly, it reduces the incentive for the party disfavored 
by subsequent events (who, after all, is the likely shader) to engage in 
opportunistic litigation in the first place.  In the setting of a completely 
specified contract, therefore, courts are less mistake prone and parties 
less likely to encourage mistakes, resulting in less risk of judicial error. 
B. Bilateral Contracting Under Moderate Uncertainty: The Case of Rules 
and Standards 
Now suppose the contracting parties confront moderate levels of 
 
may be added to this Agreement by addenda to Exhibit A signed by both parties.  
Such addenda will be numbered sequentially, A-12, A-13 and so on. 
In consideration of the above and the mutual promises contained herein, Apple and 
SCI agree as follows . . . 
Fountain Manufacturing Agreement Between Apple Computer Inc., and SCI Systems, Inc. 
(May 31, 1996) [hereinafter Fountain Manufacturing Agreement], http://contracts.onecle.com
/apple/scis.mfg.1996.05.31.shtml [http://perma.cc/YD36-B6BS]. 
62.  See, e.g., Data Management Outsourcing Agreement Between Allstate Insurance 
Company and Acxiom Corporation, (March 19, 1999) [hereinafter Data Management 
Outsourcing Agreement], http://contracts.onecle.com/acxiom/allstate.outsource.1999.03.19.sht
ml [http://perma.cc/NAZ6-LDEA] (defining thirty-four technical or non-standard meanings, 
including specialized meanings of “Agreement,” “Confidential Information,” “Data Integrity,” 
“Current Projects,” “Affiliate,” “End-User,” “Material Default,” “Party,” “Person,” 
“Problem,” “Term,”’ “Work Order,” and “Work Product”) . 
63.  See, e.g., Fountain Manufacturing Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 22 (providing a 
list of “General Terms” ranging from the relationship of the parties to complete agreement). 
64.  For discussion, see Schwartz & Scott, supra note 12, at 952–55. 
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uncertainty in the sense that they can identify what should happen in 
some, but not every, future states of the world.  One clear example is the 
decision to hire a sales representative to market the firm’s electronic 
products following their manufacture.  The parties can specify what they 
want the agent to accomplish as matters stand at the time of drafting the 
contract: They can identify the potential customer base, or geographic 
region, and they can specify sales goals.  But they cannot detail how the 
agent will try to market the products, how the agent will allocate her time 
across different products, or what adjustments the agent should make if 
market conditions change or competitors alter their strategies.  Similarly, 
what if the product is a new drug and the contract contemplates a license 
between the owner of the intellectual property and an agent who agrees 
to secure regulatory approval and commercialize the product.  Contracts 
such as these exemplars will typically charge the agent/licensee with using 
“commercially reasonable” or “best” efforts to accomplish the specified 
tasks, reflecting the fact that the appropriate strategy is dependent on the 
outcome of uncertain events, such as the market demand and competitive 
conditions for the product in the first example and the results of clinical 
tests and the course of the regulatory process in the second.65  The reason 
to use standards is clear: Courts assess performance with respect to 
standards only after the relevant future events have occurred.  In this way, 
parties can obtain the advantage of hindsight: The court has information 
once the dispute arises that the parties lacked at the time of drafting the 
contract. 
Both of these examples illustrate the design challenge of granting the 
agent some—but not too much—discretion in choosing the strategies that 
best meet the parties ex ante expectations for performance.  In this 
intermediate range of uncertainty, sophisticated parties use design 
strategies to constrain the discretion of a court later asked to assess the 
agent’s behavior under the applicable standard.  What we see is that 
parties (or more accurately their transactional lawyers) combine precise 
or specific obligations with the broad contractual standards.66  For 
example, the contract may provide a list of specific actions the agent is 
required to undertake as exemplars of behavior that meets the best 
efforts standard.  The specific obligations are directions about the context 
through which the standard should be applied.  By combining specific 
terms with generalized obligations, the parties can add context evidence 
 
65.  For discussion, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational 
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1092–95 (1981). 
66.  Scott & Triantis, supra note 3. 
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that is revealed over the course of contract performance to the original 
text of the agreement.67  The more effectively this context evidence can 
be harnessed so as to limit the court’s discretion in applying the relevant 
standard, the more attractive is the use of standards that take advantage 
of the court’s hindsight advantage.  In this way, the parties design a 
contract to answer two key questions: When will the court look to context, 
and who decides what context matters?68 
When and to the extent parties design a regime that deploys these 
broad standards thus depends on how effectively context can be specified 
in ways that reduce the risk that a court can be persuaded by a shader to 
misunderstand or misapply the standard.69  To reduce this risk, parties can 
describe in the contract the context that will be relevant—what industry, 
what kind of products, and, when possible, the evidence the court should 
use to measure performance under the standard.  In this way, the 
contractually specified standard directs the court to make use of context 
 
67.  The listing of specific actions followed by the general standard of best efforts allows 
the parties to harness the contract maxim ejusdem generis to delimit the set of conditions under 
which the best efforts standard would apply.  Under this maxim, when a list of specific 
obligations precede a general standard, the specific words restrict the meaning of the general, 
limiting it to action of the same general type.  Scott & Triantis, supra note 3, at 848–51. 
68.  My colleagues and I have elaborated: 
Under [these] conditions of [moderate] uncertainty, . . . parties predictably seek to 
optimize total contracting costs by trading off the respective benefits and costs of 
commitment and flexibility.  They can do this by shifting costs between the front and 
back end—the two stages—of the contracting process. . . . When the parties agree, for 
instance, to use their best efforts or to behave in a commercially reasonable manner, 
the subsequent adjudication of contractual disputes concerning their efforts or 
behavior requires a court to give precise meaning to those vague phrases.  Thus, by 
using [standards such as these], parties delegate the specification of performance 
requirements to a court at the back end of the contracting process.  The parties must 
bear the expected costs of litigation (including the costs of [shading] in their conduct).  
But because a court has the benefit of some information unavailable to the parties at 
the time of formation, adjudication potentially allows them to benefit from more 
efficient performance standards than they could have specified ex ante. . . . The 
parties thus tradeoff the benefits of ex ante precision (with resulting ex post 
inefficiency) against the hindsight advantage of the court in later litigation tempered 
by the moral hazard costs inherent in the process. 
Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 17, at 454–55. 
69.  The inability of the party seeking enforcement of the contract’s terms to observe the 
counterparty’s costs (or to use any reliable proxy to check claimed increases) gives the putative 
shader an even greater incentive to claim hardship under the contract terms, even when there 
was none, to capture more of the contractual surplus.  Thus, a contract that uses broad 
standards but does not attempt to constrain the court’s discretion is inefficient: The enforcing 
party will then anticipate the subsequent bad-faith claim for good-faith adjustment and take 
precautions (such as entering into contingent contracts with other suppliers) that are costly in 
themselves and produce suboptimal investment in specific assets. 
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in addition to text, but limits the court’s inquiry to only that context 
evidence that is relevant to the particular obligation embedded in the 
standard.70  Thus even where the level of uncertainty calls for the use of 
standards, it is the parties and not the courts that choose the balance 
between text and context that best suits the level and kind of uncertainty 
the transaction protects.  
C. Bilateral Contracting with High Uncertainty: The Case of 
Collaborative Agreements 
A central design question remains: Can parties still solve the shading 
problem when even greater uncertainties challenge the skills of contract 
designers?  As the level of uncertainty rises even higher, commercial 
parties (and their lawyers) can no longer rely on the traditional forms of 
contracting.  Over the past fifteen years, the challenges of the information 
revolution have led to increasing levels of uncertainty and motivated 
parties in affected industries (and their lawyers) to innovate by designing 
entirely new and radical forms of contracting.71  Electronics is a good 
example of such an affected industry: Electronics firms compete with 
each other to anticipate and design the next breakthrough in 
technology—for example, the smart phone platform displaces the PC 
only to find itself displaced by whatever comes next.72 
This high-uncertainty environment, where an entirely new technology 
can disrupt the status quo, has triggered a revolution in the basic form of 
 
70.  With the aid of interpretation maxims, parties can design combinations of precise and 
vague terms that define more exactly the “space” within which a court has discretion in 
interpreting the contract.  The parties thus might use a precise term requiring adjustment of 
the contract price together with a vague standard that catches the residual factors that are not 
covered by the precise term alone.  In enforcing this vague term, therefore, the court—aided 
by the interpretation maxim of ejusdem generis (the general is limited by the specific)—will 
only choose verifiable factors that are similar in kind or related to the precise terms.  See Scott 
& Triantis, supra note 3, at 848–51. 
71.  For discussion see Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 17, at 442–48. 
72.  Beginning roughly in the 1980s and continuing to today, the profusion of new 
technological possibilities associated with what is loosely called the information revolution 
operated to intensify the systemic uncertainty arising faced by producers of electronics.  
Innovations cascaded, often leading to improvement cycles that became self-perpetuating and 
ultimately transforming the possibilities for new applications.  The computer itself is a prime 
example: Increases in computational power led to improved tools for the design of 
microprocessors, more-sophisticated materials and more-exacting manufacturing techniques 
for realizing the new designs.  These improvements then led to further increases in the power 
of computers, and the cycle then replayed.  This increasing unpredictability is manifest as the 
pervasive fear of what Clayton Christensen calls “disruptive” technologies.  CLAYTON M. 
CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT 
FIRMS TO FAIL (1997). 
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the contract.  Lawyers for these parties have innovated by designing novel 
collaborative agreements that only obligate the parties to explore 
possibilities together without committing them to execute any specific 
project.  Even though there is a formal and very detailed contract of many 
terms and pages, the contract regulates only the commitment to 
collaborate, and not the course or the outcome of the collaboration, 
which is left entirely unspecified.  That means any effort to enforce this 
agreement in court is limited to protecting each party’s promised 
investment in the collaborative process rather than directing a division of 
any surplus that might result if the collaboration were to succeed.73  
Rather than relying primarily on the threat of legal enforcement, this 
collaboration rests on a governance structure that, over time, creates 
confidence in the capabilities and trust in the character of the 
counterparty.  Trust and confidence are extremely valuable commodities: 
Not only do they motivate each party to invest in the relationship but they 
also make the prospect of abandoning the relationship in order to 
collaborate with others much less attractive.74 
The governance of these commercial collaborations shares several 
common elements.  The first element is a commitment to an ongoing, 
mutual exchange of private information designed to determine if a project 
is feasible, and if so, how best to implement the parties’ joint objectives.75  
The second element is a procedure for resolving disputes.  Its key feature 
is a requirement that the collaborators reach unanimous agreement on 
crucial decisions, with persistent disagreement resolved by unanimous 
agreement at higher levels of management from each firm.76  Together 
these two mechanisms make each party’s character traits and substantive 
capabilities observable and forestall misunderstandings.  Working under 
conditions of uncertainty, the parties can expect to encounter 
unanticipated problems that can only be solved jointly and that may 
generate occasions of disagreement.  Their increasing knowledge of each 
other’s capacities and willingness to share private information in service 
of their collective goals facilitates the resolution of problems and 
constrains opportunistic behavior.77 
 
73.  See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Emisphere Techs. Inc., 408 F. Supp. 2d 668, 696–97 (S.D. 
Ind. 2006) (holding that the contractual remedy for breach of a collaborative agreement is 
limited to the right to terminate and retain accrued scientific information). 
74.  Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 52, at 1405–10. 
75.  Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 17, at 476–79. 
76.  Id. at 479–81. 
77.  Id.  A non-exhaustive and non-random sample of collaborative contracts that 
combine formal and informal elements in the manner described in the text can be found at 
 2015] CONTRACT DESIGN AND THE SHADING PROBLEM 29 
The limited legal commitment contemplated by collaborative 
contracting means that there is a significant constraint on the potential 
role of a court charged with policing shading.  Any resulting agreement 
to produce a specified product or to purchase a key input to production 
(the usual stuff of contracts) is not part of the formal contract at all.  
Rather the substantive outputs of the collaboration develop only from the 
informal relationship of mutual trust that is the result of the collaboration 
process itself.  In effect, collaborative contracting endogenizes trust by 
formalizing a process that builds parties’ confidence in one another and 
thereafter supports investments in their joint objectives based on the trust 
created.  It follows that a reviewing court’s primary focus will be limited 
to questions of character rather than capability: Has one party cheated, 
say by using information gained during the collaboration for its own 
private purposes?  Giving generalist courts the single responsibility of 
rooting out “red-faced” cheating reduces any instinct the court may have 
 
onecle.com, http://www.onecle.com, and the Contracting and Organizations Research Institute, 
http://cori.missouri.edu [http://perma.cc/X8DW-92NB].  See, e.g., Agreement between Phoenix 
Technologies Ltd. and Intel Corporation (December 1995), 
http://contracts.onecle.com/phoenix-tech/intel.supply.1995.12.18.shtml 
[http://perma.cc/8YQE-6TZM] (supply contract for Phoenix to be a principal supplier of 
system-level software to Intel); Airbus A320 Purchase Agreement between AVSA S.A.R.L. 
and New Air Corporation (Apr. 20, 1999), 
http://contracts.onecle.com/jetblue/airbus.a320.1999.04.20.shtml [http://perma.cc/ZF2E-
HT4U] (JetBlue and Airbus purchasing agreement); Component Supply Agreement between 
American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. and General Motors Corporation (February 18, 1994) 
(on file with author) (requirements contract for motor vehicle components to be supplied by 
AAM to GMM); Data Management Outsourcing Agreement, supra note 62 (contract for 
Axciom to develop a data acquisition system to support Allstate’s underwriting of new business 
in auto and property insurance); Development Agreement between Nanosys, Inc. and 
Matsushita Electric Works, Ltd. (Nov. 18, 2002), 
http://contracts.onecle.com/nanosys/matsushita.rd.2002.11.18.shtml [http://perma.cc/X8DW-
92NB] (collaboration agreement to develop photovoltaic devices with nano components in 
Asia); Fountain Manufacturing Agreement, supra note 61 (a contract manufacturing 
agreement for SCI to produce designated products at the Fountain, Colo., plant); General 
Terms Agreement between the Boeing Company and Spirit Aerosystems Inc. (June 30, 2006) 
(general terms agreement covering purchase orders by Boeing for particular product to be 
supplied by Spirit); Long Term Agreement between John Deere & Company and Stanadyne 
Corporation (five-year supply contract for the purchase of fuel filtration systems, injection 
nozzles, and related products by Deere from Stanadyne); Research, Development and License 
Agreement between Warner-Lambert Company and Ligand Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Sept. 1, 
1999), http://contracts.onecle.com/ligand/warner.rd.1999.09.01.shtml [http://perma.cc/L3JB-
XG4E] (pharmaceutical research and development collaboration between “big pharma” and 
“little pharma”).  See also examples of collaborative contracts cited in George S. Geis, The 
Space Between Markets and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99 (2009). 
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to roam farther into the commercial context in an attempt to find the 
parties “true” intentions.78 
D. Thick Markets and Low Uncertainty: The Case of Trade Associations 
Let’s turn now and see how scale—the thickness of the market—
changes the landscape of contract design.  All else equal, the greater the 
number of traders engaged in the same kind of a transaction, the more 
likely that the contracting infrastructure—terms adapted to current need 
in the form of standard contracts and industry codes—will be provided 
jointly as an industry-specific public good by a trade association.  I have 
just discussed how shocks in the economic environment produce 
innovations in contractual form in bilateral relationships.  Similarly, 
exogenous factors can stimulate the creation of innovative contractual 
forms in multilateral contexts.  In such a case, the contract designs are 
institutionalized outside the participating firms and arise when markets 
are thick—many contracting parties are affected by the same exogenous 
event or, even in the absence of such an event, many parties are acting in 
the same commercial environment. 
Consider, for example, the market for key commodities—grain, 
cotton, and the like.  Here we encounter a thick market where many 
parties engage in the same or similar forms of contracting.  When markets 
 
78.  Eli Lilly, 408 F. Supp. 2d 668, is an example of a court that was able to solve the 
shading problem by focusing solely on the opportunistic behavior of the shader.  The parties to 
this pharma/biotech collaboration had entered into a form of agreement that committed each 
party to share private information in the hopes of a collective scientific breakthrough.  Lilly 
subsequently undertook secret research projects using information that had been jointly 
developed.  Holding that Lilly had breached the contract and therefore forfeited its investment 
in the joint project, the court concluded: 
 Lilly and Emisphere entered into a close, collaborative research relationship that 
required trust and good faith on both sides.  After several years of joint research, Lilly 
decided it really did not need Emisphere any further, so it decided to pursue a secret 
research strategy in breach of its contractual obligations to Emisphere.  The parties 
in this case are both highly sophisticated and well-counseled businesses that have the 
right to try to exercise their full legal rights under the relevant contracts.  Lilly has 
asserted theories to justify its actions under the contracts, but those theories are not 
supported by the evidence or the law. 
Id. at 697.  By sanctioning only “red faced” violations of the collaborative agreement, such as 
the secret research group formed by Lilly outside the informal exchanges created by the 
agreement itself, the court did not attempt to regulate the nature or course of the collaborative 
interactions.  Thus, the maintenance of the collaboration protocols established by the parties, 
and of the resulting specific investments in information exchange, was left entirely within the 
province of the internally generated, informal enforcement mechanism.  The formal 
enforcement only excluded a (secret) alternative process that undermined the trust that was in 
fact generated through collaboration. 
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are thick, the costs of design can be spread in the sense that many actors 
face similar risks and stand to benefit from concerted responses to them.  
In this environment, the affected parties often institutionalize their 
contract design through the collective action of industry associations.  
Once again, the design challenge will vary according to the level of 
uncertainty faced by the actors, but scaling the contractual product 
permits novel solutions to the shading problem. 
Notice how scale changes the parties’ design responses even in low 
uncertainty settings.  Let’s assume that commercial practices in a 
particular industry are stable and well understood by a substantial 
community of traders.  Nevertheless, a generalist judge cannot be 
expected to have knowledge of such embedded trade practices or be able 
to conveniently obtain the information needed to make an accurate 
determination of which party is the shader.79  So the trade association has 
to cope with the adverse consequences of judicial ignorance while, at the 
same time, creating a framework to reduce the risk of shading.  This 
challenge motivates the trade association to engage in innovative design.  
What is the result?  Many of these trade groups have chosen to rely on 
expert arbitrators to strictly enforce industry-approved, standardized 
contract terms.  They regularly update the terms to keep them current 
with practice as it evolves.  In this way, the trade group enlists a third 
party with a limited charge: Just monitor the shading risk by holding 
parties to the strict terms of the contract.80  But what about context—the 
party-to-party adjustments that are always necessary as changed 
conditions affect performance?  That is left entirely to relational norms 
of reciprocity (tit for tat) and the discipline of repeated dealings.81  As a 
consequence, the risk of parties’ making strategic arguments about the 
“true agreement” is eliminated.  This is a solution that cabins the court’s 
 
79.  The problem here is that a generalist court is (and will remain) largely ignorant of the 
common knowledge of the trade.  The goal of the collective regime that emerges is to design 
contracts in ways that (a) “render[s] insider understanding in terms that can be incorporated 
into everyday contracting,” (b) “establish[es] methods for the expeditious resolution of 
disputes arising under these agreements,” and (c) “institutionalize[s] a process for keeping 
terms and forms of dispute resolution abreast of developments in the economic environment.”  
Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 16, at 200–02. 
80.  The contracting regime in the U.S. cotton industry that originated in the mid-
nineteenth century and took on its modern form in the 1920s is a prominent example of this 
cluster of functions.  Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry, supra note 54, 
at 1724, 1745–54.  For discussion of analogous multilateral regimes, see Bernstein, Opting Out, 
supra note 54; Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 54, at 1765, 1771–77. 
81.  See Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry, supra note 54, at 1743–
44 (describing the informal flexibility of transactors and the importance of adjudicative 
unwillingness to transform this flexibility into an obligation). 
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enforcement role much more successfully than in the parallel case of the 
bilateral standardized agreement—the paradigmatic exchange of 
purchase order and acknowledgment forms—that is governed by the 
context-friendly UCC.82  
E. Thick Markets and Higher Uncertainty: The Case of Expert Courts 
What happens in thick markets when uncertainty increases and, as in 
the case of bilateral contracting, the parties need to rely on standards so 
as to harness the hindsight advantage of a court?83  Consider the setting 
where there are a large number of highly complex transactions that share 
general features but where each transaction has significant idiosyncrasies 
and the common background conditions shift rapidly.  This is the setting 
in which, for example, the legal rules governing the obligations of boards 
of directors in corporate acquisitions are applied.  One way to understand 
why a majority of U.S. public corporations choose Delaware as an 
incorporation state is that it serves to allocate to the Delaware Court of 
Chancery jurisdiction to resolve fiduciary duty issues.  Delaware 
corporate law gives corporations wide latitude to adopt specific rules 
governing their behavior, but, in fact, Delaware corporations appear to 
have limited their ex ante contracting in the articles of incorporation and 
bylaws to formal issues such as meeting dates.  The reason is uncertainty: 
A corporation’s circumstances and the evolution of the market for 
corporate control are too uncertain to specify ex ante conduct rules that 
will govern all of the corporation’s activities in the future.84  Formal 
compliance with ex ante rules thus remains subject to ex post court review 
 
82.  The problem with sales law contracts governed by the UCC is that the number of 
parties, their relatively small size, and the idiosyncrasies of their dealings make the 
development of an interpretive community, such as in the cotton market, infeasible.  The 
heightened risk of error by a generalist court seeking to police shading is a function of two core 
problems.  The first is the growing evidence that, even in a stable world, custom and practice 
do not tend towards the kind of equillibria that can be captured in a rule, and that in a world of 
uncertainty even such jittery constancy as exists in commercial practice in quiet environments 
is constantly changing in response to exogenous and endogenous factors.  See id. at 1743–44, 
1775–76 (discussing the interaction of exogenous factors and endogenous shading responses by 
the parties).  In short, there may not be any stable custom or usage for the court to find as a 
fact, as the legal doctrine currently assumes can be done.  Second, and perhaps for the foregoing 
reasons, there is growing evidence that generalist courts do not to even try to find the relevant 
custom and usages.  This evidence suggests that many courts, lacking expertise, rely on 
interested party testimony and unsupported assumptions of reasonable commercial behavior 
rather than a careful evaluation of complex evidentiary submissions.  Bernstein, Trade Usage 
in the Courts, supra note 41, at 14–18. 
83.  This section draws on Gilson, Sable & Scott, supra note 3, at 92–95. 
84.  See Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?: 
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 87 (2001). 
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through a standard—the director and officer’s overriding obligation of 
fiduciary duty.85  Just as contracting parties operating under increasing 
uncertainty rely on standards to harness a court’s hindsight advantage, ex 
post gaps in a corporation’s articles of incorporation and bylaws are 
similarly filled by a standard.  But the thick market enables a corporation 
to mitigate the shading problem by incorporating in a jurisdiction that has 
sufficient scale of incorporations that its judges develop the necessary 
experience and expertise.86  In this respect, a modern court of equity 
resembles the early English courts of equity—the Delaware Chancery 
Court has deep knowledge of the community whose disputes it resolves, 
as did the early courts of equity with respect to the homogenous economy 
in which its litigants operated. 
In this case, the uncertainty stems from the strategic interaction of the 
various corporate actors intent on manipulating open-ended rules in 
volatile environments to advance their private interests.  On the one 
hand, the parties know the general rules that apply, but they also know 
that the counterparty will seek to exploit those rules to its advantage.  To 
the extent that actors in such an environment take collective actions to 
reduce the very uncertainty to which they have contributed, with the 
complementary aim of reducing the chance of judicial error in ex post 
application of standards such as fiduciary duty, they are able to rely on 
expert judges with significant experience in the field—to rely, that is, on 
a specialized court of equity.  The specialization of the court and its 
equitable powers assure parties that, despite the impossibility of codifying 
decision rules, judicial decisions will be taken with the fullest possible 
awareness of current understandings of good practice; that is, the court 
can with reasonable accuracy assess the context because it is part of it. 
There are other examples of courts that have the favorable attributes 
I have ascribed to early courts of equity.  This expertise results often from 
geographical concentration of industry and therefore cases.87  The Santa 
Clara County Superior Court, which is the California trial court for much 
 
85.  See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action is Lawful, Presumably There Are 
Circumstances in Which It Is Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit Corollary to the Rule 
of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 BUS. LAW. 877, 882 (2005) (describing Delaware’s judiciary as 
being known for its “use of [the equitable principles of fiduciary duty] to restrain otherwise 
lawful conduct”).  Those familiar with the common structure of Chancery Court opinions will 
recall that there is uniformly a lengthy and very detailed account of the facts—who negotiated 
with whom, what did they say, etc.—in cases that apply a fiduciary standard. 
86.  See Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 14–17 
(2006); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 757, 845–47 (1995). 
87.  See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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of Silicon Valley, is generalist in terms of jurisdiction but is specialized as 
a result of geographic industrial concentration (rather than the virtual 
concentration observed in Delaware).88  Such a match between local 
courts and local industry provides an effective legal infrastructure for an 
industrial district;89 the generalist court acquires the expertise to well 
serve its litigants—in this regard, it becomes a specialist. 
Under certain conditions, therefore, parties use their scale to invest a 
particular court with expertise in discovering the relevant context.  Courts 
in these areas of geographic concentration of similar contracting parties 
can over time develop both judicial expertise in the subject matter and a 
body of precedents that can parallel the private interpretive regimes 
created by trade associations.  In effect, in instances such as the Delaware 
Court of Chancery and the Santa Clara County Superior Court, we see a 
contracting regime that reflects both the constraints imposed by the 
problems of uncertainty and scale and the potential that generalist courts 
may become specialist courts through repeated exposure to the particular 
industry.  Under these circumstances, a generalist court can serve a 
geographic concentration of similar contracting parties by engaging in 
contextualist interpretation in careful and skillful ways that help parties 
in their quest to solve the shading problem. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion is only illustrative of the many variations in 
contract design where commercial parties have sought to mark out the 
courts’ role in the interpretive process.  The central idea is that the level 
of uncertainty and the thickness of the relevant market will determine the 
range of design strategies that are found in contemporary commercial 
transactions.  In each of these cases, my analysis suggests that a primary 
objective is to design a contract that meshes with the relational or 
informal enforcement that the context provides and thereby serves to 
cabin the role of the decision maker tasked with policing difficult-to-
verify shading behavior. 
Contracting parties must be able to count on the state’s enforcement 
monopoly if they are confidently to rely on the novel forms of agreement 
 
88.  See John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 
IND. L.J. 1345, 1397 (2012) (describing how “many corporate suits are brought in . . . the Santa 
Clara County Superior Court . . . [which] has correspondingly developed considerable 
familiarity with corporate cases”). 
89.  See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial 
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 578 
(1999) (role of law in supporting industrial districts). 
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afforded by the relevant design space.  Ideally, generalist courts should 
respond to novel contract designs by enforcing the chosen methods of 
mutual cooperation on terms consistent with the arrangements 
themselves.  A court’s ability to achieve this consistency will depend very 
generally on (a) its expertise in the domain of the contract, (b) the 
conspicuousness of the particular contractual regime (i.e., the salience of 
the industry codes or other markers that indicate to outsiders that insiders 
have given distinctive meaning and effect to strategies for coping with 
shading), and (c) the extent to which the court respects the purposes and 
values to which the regime is dedicated.  
The role of generalist courts will differ across the various dimensions 
I have outlined, but in all events it will be more restricted than the 
standard account under which the court is supposed to fit quite different 
forms of contracting into the traditional doctrinal categories of common 
law contract.  If a central goal of contract adjudication is to enforce the 
contract that the parties have provided, then the courts need to accept the 
role that the parties have given them.  To do that, both judges and 
contract theorists must attend to the unique characteristics of the 
contracts currently being designed by sophisticated parties.  Here courts 
must practice the passive virtues because it is the parties, and not the 
courts, that reduce the risks of opportunism in contract adjudication. 
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